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This paper provides micro and macroeconomic analysis of the economic role of banks in the 
Russian economy. Using a large panel containing Russian enterprises’ balance sheet and 
income statement data, we evaluate the determinants of bank financing. Econometric model 
put out the existence of liquidity providing activity of Russian banks. Even though the overall 
liquidity provision system suffers from certain deficiencies, we demonstrate its importance in 
the macroeconomic context, using time series econometric analysis. Bank credit appears to be 
a significant factor in explaining the non-payment dynamics and use of informal financing. 
Finally, the uncertainty concept helps us to understand the reasons for a limitation of Russian 
banks in their liquidity providing role.  
 
Keywords: liquidity, finance, transition, Russia, uncertainty, banks, inter-enterprise credit. 
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Liquidity provision in transition economy:  





Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan Venäjän pankkien taloudellista merkitystä mikro- ja 
makrotasolla. Pankkirahoitusta määrääviä tekijöitä tarkastellaan käyttämällä suurta 
paneeliaineistoa Venäjän pankkien tuloslaskelma- ja tasetiedoista. Ekonometrisen mallin 
avulla tutkitaan, kuinka venäläiset pankit tarjoavat luottoasiakkailleen likviditeettiä. Vaikka 
koko talouden likvidiydessä on puutteita, tutkimuksessa osoitetaan aikasarja-aineiston avulla, 
että likvidiydellä on kuitenkin makrotaloudellista merkitystä. Pankkiluottojen määrä 
osoittautuu merkittäväksi selittäjäksi yritysten maksamattomien velkojen ja epämuodollisen 
rahoituksen dynamiikassa. Epävarmuus on tärkeä seikka selitettäessä pankkien 
luotontarjonnan rajallista roolia Venäjällä. 
 
Asiasanat: likvidiys, rahoitus, siirtymätalous, Venäjä, epävarmuus, pankit, yritysten välinen 
rahoitus BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





1  Introduction 
 
The Russian banking sector is often reproached for being counterproductive and for not 
assuming its economic role. It is a matter of fact; the credit/GDP ratio in Russian economy is 
relatively law: whereas in Germany and France it is more than 100% of GDP, in Russia it is 
actually only about 16%. The proportion of investment financed by bank credit is low (about 
4.8% in 2003). Weak capitalization and opportunist behavior are the most often cited 
characteristics of Russian banks
1. Certainly, the Russian banking system has experienced a 
number of financial crises (1994, 1995 and 1998) during the transition period. Financial crises 
were partly a consequence of banks financial speculations and their lack of interest to real 
sector financing. However, our findings show that the banks have played an important role in 
Russia: they provide liquidity to the productive sector. Even though we observe some 
deficiencies in the actual liquidity provision system, we demonstrate its great importance to 
the economy.   
  The paper is organized as follows: the first section gives a summary of the theoretical 
issues concerning banks’ role in the economy. The second section contains an evaluation of 
the bank credit role for Russian enterprises, using a large panel of enterprise financial reports. 
The third section estimates the overall economic importance of Russian banks liquidity 
provision. The section 4 concludes by suggesting a theoretical framework to explain the 
limitation of Russian banks on liquidity provision.  
 
2  Banks' economic role: theoretical approaches 
 
According to the well known Gurley and Shaw [1960]
2 approach, financial intermediaries’ 
role in the economy is to provide a mechanism for channeling funds from financial-surplus 
agents to those with financial deficits. More recent studies by Allen and Gale [1995]
3 and 
                                                 
1  See for example Pitiot H., Scialom L.,[1993], “Système bancaire et dérapage monétaire”,Economie 
Internationale,N°54, 2eme trimester and more recently Matovnikov [2000] Funktsionirovanie Bankovskoy 
sistemy v Rossii v usloviakh makroekonomicheskoy nestabilnosti, Institute of Economy of Transition, Nauchnye 
Trudy, N°23P, Moscow. 
2 Gurley J., Shaw E., [1960], Money in a Theory of Finance, Brookings Institution. 
3 Allen F., Gale D., [1995], “A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and Financial Markets in Germany and 
the US”, European Economic Review, N°2, March, 179-209. Anna Dorbec 
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Allen and Santomero [1998]
4 point out the role of intermediaries in risk trading. This 
approach is not focused on banks specificcally: however it appears than banks are better 
managers of intertemporal risk smoothing while financial markets are more efficient in cross-
sectional risk sharing. 
  A vast theoretical literature on banks’ role in the economy (for surveys see 
Bhattacharya and Thakor [1993]
5, Chevalier-Farat [1992]
6) points out two main 
characteristics of banks. The first is due to financial market imperfections in an asymmetric 
information environment.  Informational imperfections generate a particular hierarchy of 
firm’s financial sources (A). The second specific characteristic of banks points to their 
liquidity provision role (B).  
 
2.1  Bank credit as a source of finance to enterprises 
In an economy with perfect financial markets, any firm is able to finance any positive net 
present value project. If the cost of investment exceeds the firm's internal resources, or if the 
firm prefers to use its internal funds to pay dividends, it can raise the funds required for 
investment in the capital market or borrow from banks
7. In such idealized markets, the source 
of capital used to finance investment is irrelevant and financial constraints do not restrain 
firms' growth. 
  In real financial markets there are various imperfections that may impose costs on 
firms that obtain investment funds externally. Many of these imperfections are rooted in 
conflicts of interest between investors and firms' insiders – the phenomenon largely known in 
the theory as agency problems. Jensen and Meckling [1976]
8 were the first to suggest a 
theoretical framework related to such problems. The firms' insiders have an incentive to 
exploit outside investors by investing in projects that benefit insiders and may lower the value 
of the outsiders' investment. In this situation, banks play a positive role by mobilizing 
                                                 
4  Allen F., Santomero A.M.,[1998], “The Theory of Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance,N°21,1461-1485. 
5 Bhattacharya S., Thakor A., [1993],  « Contemporary Banking Theory », Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
N° 3, pp. 2-50 
6  Chevalier-Farat T.,[1992],   «  Pourquoi des banques  », Revue d'Economie Politique, Septembre-Octobre, 
pp.633-685 
7 This is the idealized financial market studied by Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
8  Jensen M., Meckling W.,[1976],”Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure”, Journal of Financial Economics,N°3,305-360 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





resources, identifying good projects, monitoring managers and managing risk (Levine 
[1997]
9, Levine, Loayza, Beck [2000]
10).  
  To protect their investment, outside investors and creditors have several options. They 
may require that mechanisms be put in place to monitor the actions of the firm. They may also 
attempt to constrain the firm contractually from engaging in opportunistic behavior. This 
monitoring and legal enforcement is costly. If these measures are not completely effective, 
then investors will take into account the cost of expected opportunistic behavior when 
transacting with the firm. As a result, the firm's cost of external capital will increase. Where 
the costs of enforcement are high and insiders' opportunities for diverting resources abundant, 
businesses may not be able to obtain investment capital at any price
11. 
  This approach supports the pecking order theory developed by Myers and Majluf 
[1984]
12. They argue that financial market imperfections make it costly for firms with 
inadequate cash flow to obtain external financing. The imperfections mean that when a firm 
seeks financing it does so according to a pecking order: own funds are preferred to external 
funds and debt is preferred to equity, as the market for loans is subject to less adverse 
selection than the market for equity.  
  In fact, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988]
13 observed correlations between long-
term investment and internal financing in a sample of financially constrained firms. This 
interpretation has been questioned by Kaplan and Zingales [1995]
14, who defined the internal 
pecking order (not the external constraint) and found a particular role for cash flow, as a 
signal of investment opportunities. 
  These considerations of market failure suggest that there may be certain categories of 
investment expenditure that are easier to fund externally. In particular, liquid assets whose 
value is readily ascertainable and which can be readily repossessed may be easier to fund than 
specialized equipment. If loans can be secured by such assets separately, or if these assets can 
                                                 
9 Levine, R.[1997] “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, June 
10 Levine, R; Loayza, N. Beck, T.[2000] “Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes,” Journal 
of Monetary Economics. 
11 See the discussions of credit rationing by Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and of adverse selection by Myers and 
Majluf [1984] 
12  Myers S.C., Majluf N.S.,[1984],”Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have 
Information that Inversors Do not Have”,Journal of Financial Economics,vol 13, June,187-221 
13  Fazzari S., Hubbard R., Petersen B.,1988, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment”, Brookings 
Papers of Economic Activity,vol.1 
14 Kaplan S., Zingales L. [1995] « Do Financing Constraints explain why investment is correlates with cash 
flow? » NBER Working paper 5267, September  Anna Dorbec 
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be securitized, then investment in these categories of assets can be financed externally at 
relatively low cost
15. 
  Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, [1996]
16 empirically estimate sources and uses of 
different types of financing. This estimation may be viewed as testing whether the Myers-
Majluf pecking order is consistent with the data on the financing of two different categories of 
investment. The large cross country panel econometric study (the panel does not include 
Russia) suggests that external suppliers of capital have a comparative advantage in financing 
short-term assets, perhaps because of lower contracting and monitoring costs. Thus, a 
principal role of external finance for established firms may be in providing financing for their 
liquid assets, allowing them to redeploy internal funds to finance long-term investment. 
  The recent study of Fisman and Love [2003] 
17 focused on a specific role for trade 
credit as a financial source for enterprises. Analyzing data from 37 sectors and 44 countries,
18 
they demonstrate that firms in countries with less developed financial systems use implicit 
borrowing in the form of trade credit as an alternative source of funds. They suggest than in 
some cases (particularly with weaknesses in law enforcement mechanism and transparency) 
inter-enterprise credit could be less exposed to some types of informational asymmetry. Biais 
and Gollier [1997]
19 suggest that suppliers can give signals on specific firms which could 
induce banks to augment their credit offers to those firms. In such cases trade credit plays a 
signaling role for banks, and firms could even be subject to discrimination vis-à-vis the trade 
credit terms they get from suppliers. Petersen and Rajan [1998]
20 have shown that the trade 
credit can be used as a means of price discrimination. Better access to credit from financial 
institutions induces firms to offer more trade credit. This suggests that firms may intermediate 
between institutional creditors and other firms that have limited access to financial 
institutions. 
                                                 
15 Beck T., Demirgüç-Kunt A., Levine R. [2001], “Law, Politics, and Finance”, World Bank Working Paper, 
February. 
16 Demirgüc-Kunt  A., Maksimovic V.,[1996], « Financial Constraints, Uses of Funds, and Firm Growth An 
International Comparison » The World Bank Working Paper, October. 
17 Fisman R., Love I., [2003], Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development and Industry Growth, Journal 
of Finance, Vol LVIII, N°1, Feb. See also Petersen M., Rajan R., [1997], “Trade Credit: Theories and 
Evidence”, Review of Financial Studies, 10, pp.661-691. 
18 Issued from Compustat data for 1980-1989. The sample does not include Russia. 
19 Biais B., Gollier C., [1997], « Trade Credit and Credit Rationing », Review of Financial Studies, 10, 903-937. 
20 Petersen M., Rajan R., [1996] “Trade credit: Theories and Evidence” NBER Working Paper 5602, June. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





However, in the Russian case, inter-enterprise financing has to be analyzed in a more global 
setting than simple trade credit relations. The analysis of Perrotti and Gelfer [1998]
21 focused 
on intraindustrial-financial group (or conglomerate) financing. They demonstrated the 
existence of intragroup financial transfers in the Russian economy. Enterprises which are 
members of official conglomerates appear to be less financially constrained than their 
‘independent’ colleagues. This necessitates taking into account an alternative capital 
reallocation process for industrial and financial conglomerates in Russia.  
 
More generally we can distinguish three financing regimes characterized by the degree of 
importance of external finance (Paranque [1999]
22): 
- Autonomy regime: the main finance pattern is based on profit accumulation which 
  provides an important endowment of own funds and enables to limit their demand for 
  external funds for financing fixed and circulating capital 
- Debt regime: firms actively use external financing - and particularly bank financing - 
  to finance their assets as a whole 
- Overdraft regime (which differs from the other): enterprises finance their investment 
  activities from their own funds, as under the first, but they use short term bank credit 
  to cover their current finance (liquidity) needs. 
 
La Porta and al [1998]
23 point out another important factor impacting finance behavior and 
more generally economic performance. They argue that the legal system is the primary 
determinant of the effectiveness of the financial system in facilitating innovation and 
growth.
24 Rajan and Zingales [1999]
25 however argued that even in countries with weak legal 
and accounting systems and frail institutions, powerful banks
26 can still force firms to reveal 
information and pay their debts, thereby facilitating industrial expansion.  
 
                                                 
21 Perrotti E., Gelfer S.,[1998] “Investment financing in Russian Financial-Industrial Groups, Wiliam Davidson 
Institute working Papers Series 342 
22 Paranque B. [1999], « Flexibilité financière des PME », mimeo 
23 La Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F; Shleifer, A; and Vishny, R [1998]. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political 
Economy, , 106(6), pp. 1113-1155 
24 For a more extensive discussion of the role of commitments and the legal system in investment see 
Williamson (1994, 1988) and Shleifer (1994). For a cross-country empirical analysis of the effect of institutional 
differences on debt maturity see Demirguic-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996). 
25 Rajan, R., Zingales, L. “Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth”,mimeo 1999. 
26 In fact, banks are institutions and their force could partly replace public institutions weakness Anna Dorbec 
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2.2  Liquidity provision 
Liquidity provision can be summarized by offering a joint service of payment and finance 
(Diamond, Dybvyg [1983]). In fact, on the asset side, banks make loans to difficult, illiquid 
borrowers, thus enhancing the flow of credit in the economy. On the liability side, they 
provide liquidity on demand to depositors. 
  This function is closely related to what Keynes [1937]
27 called ‘finance’. Keynes 
distinguished two main types of ‘finance’
28: ‘finance’ of production and ‘finance’ of 
investment. An advance of liquidity is a necessary condition to start up a production or 
investment project: we can buy nothing with promises of receipts; the entrepreneur needs 
financial resources to spend. By granting long and medium term credit, banks finance 
investment, and via short term credits and overdraft facilities, they satisfy the demand for 
production finance. The demand for finance can generate credit money creation
29.  
  The recent work of Kachyap, Rajan and Stein [2002]
30 focused on banks role as 
liquidity providers. The authors develop a partial equilibrium model which demonstrates 
positive synergy effects for banks, caused by coexistence within the same organization (bank) 
of credit (and particularly overdraft facilities) and deposit services. 
  In the Diamond and Dybvyg, [1983] framework, banks can transform illiquid assets 
into more liquid demand deposits. In a risky environment, demand deposit contracts which 
provide liquidity are subject to multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs can 
cause real economic damage. The analysis shows that there are circumstances in which 
government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.  
  The recent work of Diamond and Rajan [1999]
31 notes that both investors and 
borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they are unsure 
about when they will want to end their holding of a financial asset. Borrowers are concerned 
about liquidity because they are unsure about their ability to continue to attract or retain 
funding. Because borrowers typically cannot repay investors on demand, investors will 
                                                 
27 Keynes J.M., “Alternatives theories of the rate of interest”, Economic Journal, June, 1937, D.H. Robertson, 
“Mr Keynes and “Finance” and response of Keynes, Economic Journal, June 1938. 
28 Notice, however that in Keynesian perspective‘finance’ can be offered by banks as well as by financial 
markets. 
29 Goux J-F., [1987], «  La théorie monétaire de la «  finance  » chez Keynes  : une réinterprétation  », Révue 
d’Economie Politique, , N5, pp.592-612. 
30 Kashyap A., Rajan R., Stein J. , [2002], « Banks as Liquidity Providers : An Explanation for the Coexistence 
of Lending and Deposit Taking », Journal of Finance, Vol LVII, N°1, Feb. 
31 Diamond  D., Rajan R. [1999], « Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility : a Theory of 
Banking » NBER Working Paper 7430, December BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





require a premium or significant control rights when they lend directly, as compensation for 
their illiquidity. By developing an overlapping generations model in a risky environment the 
authors demonstrate that banks can resolve liquidity problems that arise in direct lending. 
Banks enable depositors to withdraw at low cost and buffer firms from the liquidity needs of 
their investors. In such a framework the bank will necessarily have a fragile capital structure, 
subject to bank runs, in order to perform these functions. Far from being an aberration to be 
regulated away, the funding of illiquid loans by a bank with volatile demand deposits is 
rationalized in the context of the functions it performs.   
  However, the analysis of banks liquidity providing role cannot be realized without 
taking into account its macroeconomic dimension (Chevalier-Farat [1992]). Generally 
speaking, the analysis in terms of liquidity is closely related to the monetary character of the 
economy and to the hypothesis about the overall informational environment. In a monetary 
economy, the banking system monetizes claims whose exact values are generally not known  
with certainty: transforms private claims in incontestable payment means
32 (the degree of 
incontestability is related to the notion of trust in the money and banking system (Aglietta, 
Orléan, [2002])
33). Consequently, liquidity provision cannot be analyzed outside of the macro 
economic context, which includes three levels: liquidity provision from commercial banks to 
their customers, interbank liquidity provision and central bank liquidity provision to 
commercial banks (regular, through money market interventions, and exceptional, including 
that provided as lender of last resort).  
 
3  What role for Russian banks? 
3.1  Macroeconomic evidence 
In the early stage of development of the Russian banking system, banks faced enormous 
payment system problems (Aglietta, Moutot, [1993]
34). Relatively stable economic conditions 
and special efforts by the Russian central bank solved the payment system problem, but the 
overall liquidity failure and speculative opportunities prevented the real sector from having 
                                                 
32 Aglietta M., [1988] « L’ambivalence de l’argent », Revue Française d’Economie, été 
33 Aglietta M., Orléan A.,[2002] “La monnaie: entre violence et confiance”, Paris, Odile Jacob 
34 Aglietta M. Moutot P. [1993], “Redeployer des réformes”, Economie Internationale, N°54, 2
ème trimestre, pp. 
67-104 Anna Dorbec 
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35. Matovnikov [2000] points out the unsatisfactory role of banks in the 
highly bartered 1995-1998 economy. The remonetization of the economy, which followed the 
August 1998 crisis, was positive for banks’ ‘reorientation’ from speculative operations to the 
real economy. According to the ‘finance’ approach, advances in liquidity can be used to 
support production or investment needs. To simplify, we can distinguish four principal 
sources of investment financing: own funds (profit and amortization fund), capital emissions, 
debt (bank, non bank and affiliated), and state funds (federal, local budget and extra-
budgetary funds). In the Russian case firms’ own funds (profit and amortization) are the 
primary source investment financing. However, from Rajan and Zingales [1998], we know 
that in economies where intermediated financing plays an important role, structural changes 
and economic growth can be facilitated by good access to debt and market financing.  
 
Figure 1. Sources of investment financing of Russian enterprises I/1994-III/2003 
 
Source : Goskomstat
36, large and medium-size enterprises 
 
Goskomstat (GKS) data show that during the transition period investment has been financed 
mainly by firm’s own funds. We observe nevertheless a recent increase of external private 
sources of financing. These include: bank credit, inter-enterprise (often intra-conglomerate) 
credit, extra-budgetary public financing and stock and bond issuance. Basing on more detailed 
                                                 
35 Dorbec A., Renversez F.[2004], “Mechanisms of Russian  rconomy financing during the transition”, Studies 
on Russian Economic Development, forthcoming 
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GKS data we see a notable increase in intra-group inter-enterprise financing (from 8.5% in 
2002 the home office share increased to 13.6% in 2003 while other inter-enterprise debt went 
from 5.7% to 7.9%). Some of this financing is hidden under ‘others-2’ (16.7% in 2002 to 
21.5% in 2003). Nevertheless, we observe that the bank financing share was almost 
unchanged at 5% of total investment financing during the last four years. Capital markets’ 
share is insignificant (0.2% of investment for stocks and 0.2% for bonds in 2003)! Thus, we 
conclude that the recent growth of external financing is principally due to inter-enterprise 
(intra-conglomerate) profit transfers and not to increases in banks’ participation in the 
investment process.  
 














Credit to enterprises, more
than 3 years RUR USD
Credit to enterpises, 1-3
years RUR USD
credit to entreprises,
181days-1 year RUR USD
credit to entreprises, 91-180
days RUR USD
credit  to enterprises, 31-90
days RUR USD
credit to enterprises, <30
days RUR USD
 
Source: Bank of Russia 
 
Figure 2 clearly shows a weakness of long and medium term credit and a dominance of short 
term financing in banks credit activity: 70% of bank credit is extended for less than 1 year. 
Note that the ‘under 30 days’ credit is the segment of the credit portfolio that increased the 
most during 2001-2003, so that, basing on macroeconomic data, we would argue for the 
liquidity-providing role of banks in the Russian economy. 
 
 
 Anna Dorbec 
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3.2  Microeconomic evidence 
However, the macroeconomic evidence alone seems insufficient to establish the liquidity- 
providing role of banks. Investment financing may be concentrated on certain sectors. On the 
other hand, bank credit could be a part of speculative financial schemes and not at all 
supportive real activity. Consequently, we refer to disaggregated accounting data to obtain 
more evidence on the role of bank credit role in enterprise financing.   
 
3.2.1  Data source 
We make econometric estimations based on annual balance sheet and income statement data 
(forms 1 and 2 of the official Russian accounting report) published by the Federal 
Commission on Securities Markets under the information disclosure program. We use rolled 
panel data covering the five year period 1996-2000 and including 487 big and medium size 
enterprises
37. Annex 1 contains detailed information on the representativeness of our panel 
sample. 
  In order to correct for size and period bias and to identify branch features we made 
estimations for size, sub-period and branch sub-samples. Size sub-samples were constructed 
using data on the number of employees.
38 We created two sub-samples, one for small and 
medium size enterprises (less than 200 employees) and the other for the biggest enterprises 
(>1000 employees). Sub-period sub-samples were constructed by splitting our sample into 
two 2-year samples and excluding the crisis year 1998 in order to correct for possible crisis 
chock. The first sub-sample contains data for 1996 and 1997 and the second for 1999 and 
2000. 
  Our panel includes enterprises of different economic and industrial branches: light 
industry, food, metallurgy, machine building, extraction, energy, chemicals/petrochemicals 
(incl. pharmaceuticals), wood & paper, trade, transport, telecommunications, construction, 
nonbank financial intermediation, research & development. Branch sub-sample estimations 
were made only using sufficiently large representative industries (7 sub-samples, including 
                                                 
37 We excluded “giant” size enterprises like Gazprom and RAO EES, Lukoil, TNK because their financing 
patterns are particular and not typical for all Russian enterprises. Because of their size, the presence of such 
enterprises in our sample could considerably bias the estimations. The outliers’ identification method used is 
Tukey Box Plot, (Kremp [1990]).  
38 These data are available only for 335 of 487 enterprises BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





telecommunications, energy, metallurgy, chemicals petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
machine building, food and beverages, trade and supplying). 
 
























1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
bank debts inter-enterprise debts other debts
 
 
Descriptive analysis of our panel data clearly shows that the importance of external sources of 
financing increases over the period. We can see from Figure 3 the importance of inter-
enterprise financing and the gradual increase in the importance of bank finance: banks 
financed only 2 % of enterprise assets in 1996 and 8% in 2000. These dynamics reveal the 
emergence of a financial transfer mechanism which is not based exclusively on bank 
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Figure 4. Inter-enterprise credit structure ( % of total liabilities)          
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3.2.2  Variables and initial hypothesis 
The main purpose of our study is to evaluate the role of bank credit for Russian enterprises. 
We also examine other sources of financing and compare them with bank credit in order to 
evaluate parameters which influence the availability of bank credit (demand and supply). 
As the endogenous variable (DETTE_BQ) we retained a bank credit. So, it represents a sum 
of lines 511 and 611 of form 1 of the enterprise accounting report.  
 
3.2.3  Exogenous variables  
Looking at existing studies on the role of bank credit as a finance source for enterprises 
financial source (for a survey see Sheuer and Sauvé, [1999]) we see that the variables used in 
specifications are relatively heterogeneous. However, indicators of size and profit are used in 
the majority of them. Proxies for the cost of debt, as well as firms’ guaranties are used by 
Kremp, Stöss and Gerdesmeier [1999]
39. The question of cost of debt logically of course 
matters in financial decisions even though informational imperfections, as in Stiglitz and 
Weiss [1981] can lead to rationing, under which the interest rate loses its status as the main 
                                                 
39 Kremp E., Stöss E. and Gerdesmeier D. [1999] “Estimation d’une fonction d’endettement” in Sauvé and 
Sheuer, op.cit. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





variable equilibrating supply and demand for credit. However, in our sample internal interest 
rate calculations (interest payments/bank debt) appear not to reflect real interest payments of 
firms (Kharchenko-Dorbec [2002]). Firstly, we made comparisons between calculated internal 
interest rates and official market credit interest rates (Central Bank of Russia data) and it 
appears that the internal rates are actually lower
40. We may thus suppose the existence of 
‘non-market’ relations between enterprises and their banks. Secondly, the pecularities of 
Russian accounting law enable enterprises to include interest rate payments in ‘general costs’, 
and in this case these will not appear separately in income statement data, which then biases 
the internal interest rate calculation. Finally, we preferred to exclude such a biased internal 
interest rate indicator from our estimations. 
For our analyses we retained the following variables: 
 
Turnover (L10): (line 10 of enterprise’s income statement). This parameter could give a 
positive signal to the banks as to the current activity of the enterprise and may have a positive 
influence on the supply of bank credit. Different specifications of turnover were used in Rajan 
and Zingales [1995], and Biais Hillion and Malecot [1995] as proxies for size. The expected 
effect is again positive.   
 
Profit – (L2140) line 140 of income statement. It seems obvious that high profits are a 
positive signal for banks (and other external finance suppliers) as to an enterprise’s financial 
performance. However, the pecking order approach (Myers, [1984]) suggests a negative 
relation between profit and the demand for bank credit: own sources are preferred by 
enterprises over external debt. In the existing empirical studies on different countries (such 
studies for Russian enterprises are not available), profit variables usually have a negative 
impact on bank indebtedness (see e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maximovic [1996]). 
 
                                                 
40 We have to mention, however, that during the period of liquidity shortage and GKO speculation in 1996-1998 
interest rates in real terms attained extremely high levels, especially compared with enterprises profitability, so 
some differences in banks interest rates can exist especially for banks which were not involved in GKO 
speculation (Kharchenko-Dorbec, Renversez, [2004]). Anna Dorbec 
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3.2.4  Inter-enterprise debt 
In order to obtain a more precise picture concerning the inter-enterprise source of financing, 
we decomposed inter-enterprise credit into contractual loans, affiliated loans, trade credit and 
advances received: it appears that these types of debt play a different role in the financing of 
Russian enterprises. However, the expected impact of some variables is still ambiguous, since 
we cannot obtain more detailed data on financial suppliers and the existence of informal 
affiliation links.  
 
Inter-enterprise contractual loans (CREDITIEC) – lines 512 and 612 of balance sheet. This 
variable represents loans received through loan contracts from nonbank firms (including 
nonbank financial intermediaries). Theoretical assumptions about such sources of financing 
are ambiguous. There may be  sources alternative to bank credit when the banking system is  
weak and inefficient because other firms may be better able to offer financing due to their 
superior better knowledge of an enterprise’s particular situation or of the situation regarding 
the industry (Schwartz, [1974]). Thus, in the case of the existence of important contractual 
(institutionalized) financial mechanisms as alternative to bank credit, we should expect a 
negative relation. On the other hand, the importance of external nonbank financing may be a 
positive signal for banks as to the enterprise’s financial situation. This fact will cause a 
positive relation in the case where the banks are, a priori interested in enterprise financing but 
suffer from important informational asymmetry problems (Biais and Gollier [1997]). 
However, in the Russian case we must take into account the evidence that this type of 
financing could be part of a relatively opaque intra-group nonmarket financial scheme and 
thus not at all affect a bank credit as a signal. 
 
Trade credit - (L621) – 621 line of balance sheet. A large literature on trade credit 
importance reveals several motives for firms to use trade credit as a finance source (some 
where mentioned in section 1A). In fact, in the asymmetric information environment with 
weak financial markets, trade credit can be used as an alternative finance source to bank 
credit. In a situation of rationing of bank credit, trade credit becomes more easily available to 
firms, compared to banks’ financing (Smith, [1987], Schvartz [1974], Wilner [2000], Jain 
[2001]), especially for firms with negotiating strength (due to monopoly or specific goods 
market). So we can presume the existence of a ‘trade credit’ liquidity providing mechanism BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





which is not based on contractual relations but on the supplier-customer chain. In this case we 
should expect a negative relation whose importance should increase with increasing liquidity 
constraint (small firms). The evidence on weakness of payment discipline inside the corporate 
sector (which differs by industry) can however be an additional factor contributing to the 
negative relation between bank and trade credit from the bank side.  
  On the other hand, an important commercial credit can signal a strong (monopoly) 
market position for the firm to its suppliers, and in this case banks are induced to offer more 
credit to such firms. In this case we should observe a positive relation (Biais and Gollier 
[1997]).  
 
Affiliated loans (AFFILIES) – sum of lines 623 and 628 of balance sheet. This variable 
includes short term inter-enterprise loans (without specific loan contract) from firms having 
official affiliation links with the enterprise in question, but also ‘other debts’. These ‘other 
debts’ include loans from headquarters but also other debts which we suppose to be 
informally affiliated
41. As demonstrated in Perrotti and Gelfer [1998], such affiliated 
financing plays a resource reallocation role and softens enterprise’s liquidity constraint. In this 
case (as trade credit and contractual loans) affiliated loans can be used as an alternative to the 
bank credit source of finance, especially in the case of severe bank rationing. Moreover, the 
role of affiliated debt is peculiar: if we consider as the ‘firm’ not as the accounting entity but 
as the entire conglomerate, affiliated debt can be assimilated to own funds finance. In this 
case, following a pecking order approach, we should also suppose it to be negatively related 
to bank credit.  
  On the other hand, we cannot a priori reject an eventually positive affiliated debt - 
signaling role for banks. A closely linked  affiliated company could offer liquidity  in case of 
temporary liquidity difficulties (Ziane [2004]
42). 
 
Advances – (L627) line 627 of balance sheet. From the enterprise’s perspective, an advance 
is a provision of liquidity by a customer for future delivery. The existence of hard liquidity 
                                                 
41 In fact, property rights practices are somewhat opaque in 1996-2000 Russia, and we know of many examples 
of the existence of ‘not registered’ proximity relations, such as tolling or compensation schemes, which 
apparently include not affiliated firms having in reality very close links. Generally speaking, given the relative 
importance of this item, we can suppose that firms that provide such financing cannot be complete outsiders.  
42 Ziane Y., [2004], “Crédit interentreprises et asymmetries d’information: le cas des petites enterprises”, 
MODEM Working Paper, University of Paris X-Nanterre Anna Dorbec 
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constraints for the firm implies a negative relation with bank credit: in this case, advances are 
an alternative second best source of financing.  
  On the other hand the importance to the enterprise of payments in advance could be 
considered a positive signal as to the demand for its output or its negotiation strength in 
obtaining “cash in advance”. This demand is measures in money (and not in barter or 
monetary substitutes) and could provide an estimate of future enterprise liquidity. In this case 
the relation could be positive. We should remember that monetary payments are not automatic 




Capital (Social capital) – line 410 of liabilities side of the balance sheet. Highly capitalized 
firms are better placed in some types of principal-agent problems than undercapitalized ones 
(Ross [1977]
44): owners are induced to better control managers. So, abundant capital can 
represent an additional guarantee source, which incites banks to lend and could be a good 
signal for debt suppliers (in this case the expected coefficient sign is positive). 
  In the case of strict bank credit rationing (extremely high informational opacity), 
capital issuance (in the Russian case we mean that capital is augmented by issuing 
nontradable shares
45), may be an alternative way of financing activities through the 
conglomerate channel. Moreover, in the case where official  shareholders rights are not 
sufficiently protected (which is a realistic hypothesis for the Russian environment; see Linz 
[2002]
46), nontradable share issues become a part of insiders’ financial cost optimization 
schemes and are closer to affiliated financing than to external financing. In this case we can a 
priori expect a negative relation.  
  Theoretically banks can finance two types of assets of nonfinancial firms: fixed and 
circulating capital. In our study we use proxies for both variables and try to find out which 
type of assets is financed by bank credit. In the case of nonsignificance of both variables, we 
should conclude that bank credit flows are completely outside of real sector financing and 
                                                 
43 Brana S. Maurel M. [1999] “Barter in Russia: Liquidity Shortage versus Lack of Restructuring” Working 
Paper, Paris 
44 Ross  S. [1977], “The determination of financial structure: the incentive signaling approach” Bell Journal of 
Economics, N°8 
45 Due to extremely narrow financial markets in Russia, issues of tradable shares as a finance source concern 
only about 10 Russian enterprises whose share market can be considered as liquid. Such giant enterprises 
(Gazprom, Lukoil, RAO EES etc) were excluded from our sample as outliers. 
46 Linz S. [2002], “Barriers to Investment by Russian Firms: Property Protection or Credit Constraints?” William 
Davidson working paper N°469. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





credit is mostly used for financing financial assets, and so is part of financial optimization, 
opaque privatization and tax avoidance. In this case we should conclude that real sector 
financing is ensured only by self financing and intra-conglomerate transfers. 
 
Machinery and equipment (L120) - line 120 of balance sheet. In the case of the existence of 
banks’ investment financing, we should expect a positive sign in the relation. However, macro 
economic data presented before suggest some skepticism about this hypothesis maybe 
warranted. Industrial branch sub-sample evaluation is necessary in order to determine the 
branches which attract bank investment financing. On the other hand, a large group of 
econometric studies consider the value of machinery and equipment as similar to a guarantee, 
which also suggests a positive relation
47. However, for Russian case we have to take into 
account the low liquidity of such equipment (due to its use and narrow secondary markets) 
and difficult procedures for recovery in the case of bankruptcy. So the guarantee role of 
machinery and equipment would probably not exist in the Russian case. Moreover, firms with 
much machinery and equipment can be considered inflexible. If this equipment covers the 
social sphere (houses, kindergartens, sports equipment, etc.) it represents additional charges to 
such enterprises, so that banks could be even less favorable to lend.  
 
Inventories (L210) - line 210 of balance sheet. The amount of inventories (stocks of inputs 
but also of final production) can approximate the enterprise’s need for circulating capital. A 
positive relation between inventories and bank debt would confirm our hypothesis about the 
liquidity providing role of bank credit. Some econometric studies consider stocks as 
guarantees. However, even if stocks are more liquid than equipment, insufficiently effective 
legal procedures in Russia may complicate the realization of collateral. 
  A negative relation would appear if the important inventories are perceived as a signal 
of weak performance by the enterprise in selling its products; this fact would discourage 
banks from offering finance
48. 
                                                 
47For a survey, see e.g. « Modes de financement des entreprises allemandes et françaises »,  projet de recherche 
commun de la Deutsche Bundesbank et de la Banque de France, 1999,  A. Sauvé et M. Scheuer (dir). 
48 As we observe in Brana S., Maurel M., Sgard J. [1999], « Enterprise Adjustment and the Role of Bank Credit 
in Russia: Evidence from a 420 Firm's Qualitative Survey », CEPII,Working Paper n° 99-06. Anna Dorbec 
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3.2.5  Method 
We made our estimation using two econometric approaches: static and dynamic. By static, we 
mean Within/Between and Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimations. Static estimation 
is based on variables in levels
49. In our case the need for dynamic specification by 
instrumental variables is twofold: it enables us to estimate coefficients in net flows (for 
balance sheet variables) and in surplus (for income statement variables) but also to solve a 
typical data problem due to the endogenous character of balance-sheet variables and 
simultaneity bias.
50 Dynamic estimation is done using Generalized Method of Moments. The 
combination of both methods increases the robustness of our results. 
 
3.2.6  Results 
Significant coefficients are presented in bold. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
consistent. 
  The static model is estimated by FGLS and Within methods with random effects. 
Detailed results are presented in Annex II-a. Annex II-b contains sub-period estimations 




The dynamic specification uses the GMM instrumental variables method. The estimation is 
based on first differences of variables and includes a lagged endogenous variable and period 
dummies. Variables are instrumented by their past level data lagged by 2 periods and other 
balance sheet variables.  




                                                 
49 In order to correct for possible size bias we also did estimations using size sub-samples. Estimation results are 
presented in annex II-c. It appears that even if there are some differences between small and big enterprises’ 
financing, our main results still matter for both subsamples.   
50 For more detailed explanation of econometric method,s see Sevestre P. [2002], « Econométrie des données de 
panel », Dunod, Chap. 4 -6. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





Table 1. Results from static and dynamic estimations. 
 
Variable   GMM  QGLS  Within 
Y-1 Lag  dette_bq  0.4137784     
  t Value   12.78     
 (Pr>/t/)  0     
Turnover L10  0.0128852  0.0711  0.04707 
  t Value   1.3790849  8.32   5.56  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.168  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Profit L2140  -0.243371  -0.17556  -0.09666 
  t Value   8.4823103   -7.21    -4.10  
 (Pr>/t/)  0  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Inter-enterprise contractual loans  CREDITIEC  0.0784733  0.04459  0.05089 
  t Value   4.1659792  1.59   1.89  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.000031  0.1123  0.0589 
Commercial credit  L621  -0.031128  -0.04547  -0.01128 
  t Value   1.4222395   -2.42    -0.56  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.1549  0.0154  0.5756 
Affiliated loans  AFFILIES  -0.136321  -0.06946  -0.06871 
  t Value   6.252639   -1.96    -2.06  
 (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001  0.0506  0.0398 
Advances received  L627  0.554879  0.11532  0.14168 
  t Value   10.339082  2.63   3.20  
 (Pr>/t/)  0  0.0085  0.0014 
Social capital  L410  -0.019275  0.04466  0.06312 
   t Value   0.8287048  2.81   3.81  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.4072715  0.0051  <0.0001 
Machinery and equipment  L120  -0.050901  -0.04291  -0.04944 
  t Value   3.4072733   -5.55    -5.01  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.0006562  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Stocks L210  0.8849016  0.64465  0.71399 
  t Value   10.459112  12.36   12.47  
 (Pr>/t/)  0  <0.0001  <0.0001 
 Anna Dorbec 
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3.2.7  Interpretation of results 
Lagged endogenous variable’s influence appears to be significantly positive: if the enterprise 
had access to bank credit before, it would have a better chance of obtaining credit later. This 
result is in line with practices of renewal of credit or credit line as a main procedure. Such a 
mechanism is representative of an adaptive attitude (which is necessary in the situation of 
unpredictable shocks) which enables the enterprise and its bank to adjust financing conditions 
to a changing external environment. This situation can however indicate the presence of an 
entry cost for the enterprise to obtain bank credit.  
 
Turnover. The relation is unstable: positive in the static versus not significant in the 
dynamics for the whole sample. The signaling influence of current sales appears to be weekly 
positive and not decisive. We obtain a counterintuitive significantly negative relation for the 
SME sub-sample. We can interpret it by the change in pecking order: enterprises which have 
substantial current sales are liquidity sufficient and do not ask for bank credit in the situation 
of entry barriers and credit rationing
51.  
 
Profit – all three methods converge by revealing a significantly negative relation (in flows but 
also in net surplus) between profit and bank credit.  This result is robust to all sub-sample 
specifications, so the pecking order hypothesis is confirmed: Russian enterprises prefer using 
their own funds before asking for bank financing.  
 
Inter-enterprise credit 
Inter-enterprise contractual loans (IECL) – we observe a relatively instable relation: while 
the overall sample evaluation produced a positive impact (less significant for QGLS 
estimation), the sub-samples results differ. The impact of the signaling role of IECL appears 
to be more important in the case of SME but also for three of the industries most concerned 
with arrears problems:  energy, metallurgy and machine building. In the situation of relatively 
weak transparency of firms, other enterprise financing is perceived by banks as a signal, as 
well as the existence of opportunities to provide an additional financing source in case of 
temporary illiquidity. Negative signs for the estimated coefficients for trade and food 
industries suggest the existence of some institutionalized extra-bank financial transfers to 
                                                 
51 However, to confirm this hypothesis we should do our estimations with larger SME samples. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





industries offering rapid return of investment. However, not all branches are concerned with 
such mechanisms. 
 
Commercial credit – the relation is negative, but its significance is not robust to the method 
used for the whole sample. However, sub-sample estimations reveal more clearly an 
alternative role for this type of financing. The impact is significantly negative for both sub-
periods. The importance of trade credit as an alternative source of financing is higher for SME 
(which is in line with the financial constraint hypothesis) but also significant for big 
enterprises. The instability of the whole-sample negative relation is surely due to important 
inter-sectoral differences in financing. We can easily see that the impact of trade credit to 
bank credit is positively related to differences in sectoral non-payment ratios. While for 
energy, the industry most affected by the non-payment problem during the period studied, the 
commercial credit coefficient is important and significantly negative, for communication (the 
lowest non-payment level in the economy) the relation is significantly positive, so that trade 
credit plays a positive signaling role. In this case, disaggregated data on the level of non-paid 
on time commercial credits by each enterprise, should clarify our results. Unfortunately, 
balance sheet data does not contain such information.   
 
Affiliated loans – the relation is significantly negative, so that this type of financing appears 
to be an alternative to bank credit. This result appears to be in line with existing studies on the 
importance of intra-conglomerate financial transfers
52. Affiliated financing can be considered 
as own funds of an industrial conglomerate, so that, according to the pecking order approach, 
it is closer to own funds financing than to external funds (even though in accounting such 
financing is displayed as external). However, we observe some interesting dynamics: the 
importance of affiliated loans as an alternative finance source is greater during the first sub-
period (characterized by an exceptionally severe liquidity shortage). Affiliated debt appears to 
be used more by SMEs as a finance source (due to their more important liquidity constraint) 
and is not a significant financial source for big enterprises (such enterprises can be considered 
as a conglomerate centers that are more often lenders than borrowers). Branch sub-sample 
                                                 
52 See e.g. Mesnard M. [1999] Emergence des groupes et Corporate Governance en Russie, Economie 
Internationale N°77, 1
er trimestre. Anna Dorbec 
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analysis gives a relatively homogenous picture: except for trade and metallurgy (metallurgic 
enterprises’ size is relatively big) all relations are negative.  
 
Advances – The relation is significantly positive for the whole sample; this confirms our 
hypothesis about an important role for this indicator as a signal of demand for output 
measured in money. The importance of a signal given by advances is relatively stable across 
periods. Size sub-samples however indicate that the signaling role of advances is greater for 
SMEs which is in line with information asymmetry approach. We observe that some branches 
of industry (energy, metallurgy and machine building) use advances as a finance source53. 
This result can be interpreted by referring to both inter-enterprise arrears and the industry 
concentration situation. We know that the Russian energy market is not very competitive; 
energy enterprises are monopolist on the regional level. The metallurgy branch is 
oligopolistic: entry barriers exist due to the particular technology and increasing returns 
production function. The machine building branch statistically seems quite competitive. 
However, we must take into account that firms produce extremely specific goods whose 
(national) markets are narrow, so that machine building enterprises can also use negotiation 
strength vis-à-vis customers to obtain ‘cash in advance’, which strength they do not have vis-
à-vis their banks. 
 
Social capital – we cannot establish clear relation between bank credit and enterprise’s 
capital. The whole sample analysis put out a weekly positive static relation (the coefficient is 
not significant in dynamics). Relation is clearly positive only for food and trade enterprises 
where highly capitalized firms give a positive signal to their banks. Our results provide 
indirect indication about a weakness of financial markets: the capital reflected on enterprise’s 
account is not really a variable to guarantee liquidity or solvability of enterprise.  
 
Machinery and equipment – the relation is significantly negative for the whole sample, so 
that we reject the hypotheses about both the investment financing role of banks and the 
guarantees role of equipment in the Russian environment. We did not find any particular 
                                                 
53 We observe some similarities in these three industries’ financial patterns which suggest conventional financing 
practices: having an important part of ‘oldly created’ enterprises, those industries are relatively monopolistic. All 
these industries are deeply involved in arrears problems (1
st place for energy, 3
rd place for machine building and 
4
th place for metallurgy). All of them are constrained to use advances as a liquidity source and we observe that 
IECL plays a positive signaling role for their bank indebtedness. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





industries with a clearly positive relation. This result confirms the GKS macroeconomic data 
presented below; banks do not significantly finance investment projects (Figure 1). 
 
Stocks - the relation is significantly positive for the whole sample based on the three 
estimations. This result appears to be extremely robust to all sub-sample specifications. So we 
can confirm our hypothesis about a liquidity providing role of bank credit. Banks offer to 
enterprises a ‘finance of production’ by financing their liquid assets. Sub-period estimations 
reveal that the coefficients are more important for the second sub-period, so that we conclude 
that banks are actually developing their liquidity providing activities. This liquidity provision 
is an important element of ‘overdraft financing’. 
To summarize, our econometric estimation leads to the following results:  
- a positive relation of bank credit and inventories and the importance of the signalling 
  role of advances. This clearly supports the hypothesis on the liquidity providing role 
 of  Russian  banks. 
- a negative relation with investment and a weak social capital role confirm that banks 
  do not provide ‘investment finance’, which is provided by enterprises themselves or 
 their  conglomerates.   
- banks appear to be in third position in the pecking order, after self financing and intra-
  group financing. This reveals a weakness in the corporate control mechanism and 
  more generally of institutional enforcement. 
 
 
Has this situation changed?  
The query recently completed by the Institute of Economic Forecasting (Kuvalin and Moïseev 
[2004]
54) supports our econometric results: actually banks continue to be mostly liquidity 
providers for business. 
                                                 
54 Kuvalin D. Moiseev A., [2004] forthcoming in Studies on Russian Economic Development. Anna Dorbec 
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Source: Query, 180 enterprises, mid-2003 
 
We clearly see from the chart the predominance of payment services and circulating capital 
financing. The role of bank credit as a source of medium term investment financing is limited 
to 11% of the sample enterprises (2% one year earlier). Of the enterprises, 17% are supported 
in their short term investment projects (versus 11% for 2002). We see a very good trend, but 
absolute data still suggest that bank intermediation does not play a decisive role as a source of 
investment financing but confirm the importance of banks role in liquidity provision.  
  However, as noted in section 1, the liquidity providing role has a macroeconomic 
dimension closely related to the payment system. Theoretically speaking, this role has to be 
realized jointly on three levels: bank-client, bank-bank and commercial bank-central bank 
 
1. Bank-client. By asking for a credit (or credit line) the firm is asking for liquidity for 
financing its activities until cash inflows are effectively realized.  
  Our econometric estimations confirmed a well functioning bank-client liquidity 
providing activity. 
 
2. Bank-Bank. In the interbank credit market banks provide liquidity to each other. Generally 
speaking, the interbank credit market involves the same type of liquidity provision to banks as 
banks offer to their customers. In this sence, the interbank credit market can compensate for 
the absence of a secondary market for loans (Fama [1985])  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 































































































































Interbank credit  (% of banks' assets)
Money market instruments (% of banks' liabilities)
Central bank refinancing ( % of banks' liabilities)
 
Source: Bank of Russia 
 
We clearly see from the chart the weakness of the interbank liquidity market in Russia: the 
interbank claims weight is insignificant in bank liabilities (about 1%)
55. However, money 
market instruments include some interbank credit operations (for example, deposit 
certificates), so that the weight of total interbank credit is slightly larger than interbank claims 
alone. Our estimations based on detailed data from the Central bank of Russia suggest a ratio 
of about 5% of asset operations for end-2003. Considering that the share of interbank credit in 
bank operations in France and Germany is about 30-40%, the 5% level in Russia seems 
extremely low. This weakness of interbank liquidity provision makes the overall bank 
liquidity providing system fragile and reveals a general interbank trust problem. At the same 
time, the weakness of interbank credit hampers the functioning of the financial surplus 
transfer mechanism, especially in the highly segmented
56 Russian bank system.  
 
3. Central bank runs a well functioning payment system with unconditional conversion of 
bank money into central bank money. It provides liquidity on the interbank level. By taking 
responsibility for the functioning of the payment system, it has to provide an insurance 
                                                 
55 This situation is partly a consequence on interbank crisis of 1995 
56 We observe industrial segmentation, but also an important concentration of households savings (80%) in one 
bank - Sberbank Anna Dorbec 
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mechanism for bank runs, an essential element for insuring trust in money and in the banking 
system as a whole. 
  Concerning the third level of the liquidity providing mechanism, we can see from 
Figure 6 that the weight of central bank refinancing varies notably over the period. In fact, the 
restrictive monetary policy of 1995-1998 was supported by the near absence of central bank 
refinancing. Coupled with the weakness of the interbank credit market, this was one of the 
causes of banking system fragility and general demonetization of the economy. Central bank 
refinancing increases importantly after the 1998 collapse, up to 15% of bank liabilities (due to 
remonetization of banking system in order to maintain its functioning in the trust crisis) and 
decreases actually (about 4% of bank liabilities at end-2003). We see that after 1998 the 
central bank performed better in its role as ultimate liquidity provider for the banking sector in 
liquidity crises. However, we know that the role of the central bank cannot be limited to 
interbank liquidity intervention: a deposit insurance mechanism and other institutional 
supervisory rules must be in place in order to avoid bank runs. In the Russian case the 
discussion of the a creation of a deposit insurance mechanism collides with a lack of trust in 
the banking community but also with a particular position of the biggest Russian bank – 
Sberbank, the publicly owned bank which benefits from the implicit public deposit guarantee. 
This position gives it a privileged position in the household deposit market (80% of household 
deposits) but, with the paucity of interbank financial flows redistribution, it hampers the 
reallocation function of the Russian banking system.  
  Thus, we can conclude that although the Russian banking system does provide 
liquidity to  the real sector, this liquidity providing role is weakened by the incompleteness of 
the macroeconomic (systemic) liquidity providing elements. 
 
 
4  What economic role for banks’ liquidity provision? 
 
In order to evaluate the overall importance of banks’ liquidity provision we establish 
empirical relations between main liquidity sources of the economy and four proxies of its  
demonetization. The first is a payment crisis; the second is the use of trade credit by real 
sector enterprises, the third is the use of wages and budget arrears as alternative sources of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





financing by Russian firms, and the forth is barterization. The importance of these phenomena 
is shown in Figure 7 and is widely known as a feature of Russian transition period
57.  
 

























































































































































Endnet rate Non-payment rate Trade credit ratio Barter rate
 
Source: author’s calculations basing on GKS & Russian Economic Barometer data 
 
Non-payment rate (IMPAY variable) is calculated as the percentage of inter-enterprise debt 
not paid on time to a total inter-enterprise debt. Trade credit ratio (TCREDIT variable) is an 
estimate of resources received by enterprises from their suppliers. It is constructed as trade 
credit/total liabilities. Total liabilities are the difference between enterprises’ assets and   
capital (data provided by Goskomstat). The ENDNET rate indicator represents an estimate of 
net resources received by enterprises as wage and budget arrears. It is constructed as follows: 
(Creditor indebtedness - Debtor indebtedness)/Total liabilities. Creditor indebtedness includes 
goods delivered but not paid for by enterprises (commercial credit received), budget and 
extra-budget debts, salaries debts, advances received, affiliated debts, vexels (bills of 
exchange) issued. Debtor indebtedness includes goods delivered to customers but not paid for 
by them (commercial credit extended to customers), advances paid, vexels (bills of exchange) 
accepted, affiliated debts. Since budget and salaries debts are included only in creditor 
                                                 
57 Lugovoy, Semenov, [2000], Brana and Maurel [1999] Linz and Krueger [1998], Earle and Sabirianova [2002] 
Scaffer M., Alfandari G.[1996] “Arrears” in the Russian Enterprise Sector, CERT Discussion Paper 96/8 
Hildebrandt A. [2002] “Too many to fail? Inter-enterprise arrears in transition economies”, IDEAS working 
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indebtedness, the netting on the aggregate level between creditor and debtor indebtedness 
gives a measure of budget and salary debts of the enterprise sector. BARTER rate indicator is 
the part of transactions paid for in non-monetary form (vexels (bills of exchange), barter, 
compensation, etc) as a percentage of total transactions. 
  Our estimations are based on macroeconomic Goskomstat and Bank of Russia data and 
microeconomic surveys of Russian Economic Barometer (BARTER variable) and cover the 
period from July 1995 to May 2003. All estimations were done using Generalized Method of 
Moments. We use instruments to correct for missing variables (monetary supply growth, 
dollar monetary supply growth, bank assets growth, real exchange rate, federal deficit, 
exports). To the extent that the 1998 crisis period is included in our estimation period, we 
have to adjust our estimate. We evaluated separately for two sub-periods: pre-crisis period 
July 1995-March 1998 and post-crisis period January 1999 – May 2003. Sub-samples 
estimation results are presented in Annex III-e. 
  Generally speaking, find three sources of liquidity provision to the economy 
(Renversez, Dorbec, [2003]): bank credit, central bank refinancing and the external trade 
surplus. The question is: did the liquidity provided to the economy via bank credit influence 
the general payment crisis (which peaked in 1998)? We establish simple empirical relations 
between the demonetization indicators and two relatively independent liquidity sources:  
  BC – is a part of credit to enterprises as a percentage of bank asset portfolios (Central 
Bank of Russia data). This variable represents the interest of the banking sector in enterprise 
financing and should have a negative impact on demonetization. 
  EXTERN – is calculated as external trade surplus (in rubles) as a percentage of the M2 
aggregate (Central Bank of Russia and Goskomstat data). This variable is a proxy for an 
external liquidity source and should also have a negative impact on demonetization, being at 
the same time an alternative to bank credit liquidity provision (liquidity provision is realized 
in this case thorough the inter-enterprise and intra-conglomerate channel) 
 
4.1  Results 
For stationarity reasons all regressions are evaluated in first differences. More detailed 
estimation data are presented in Annexes III. Stationarity tests on variables are presented in 
Annex IV.  
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Estimated models are:  





Table 2. Results for banks' liquidity provision 
 DIMPAY  DTCREDIT  DENDNET  DBARTER 
CONST -0.002925  -0.000928  0.000228  -0.001884 
Std. Error  0.001100  0.000651  0.001187  0.002611 
t-Statistic -2.659270  -1.426244  0.192415  -0.721721 
Prob 0.0093  0.1572  0.8478  0.4723 
DBC -0.432989  -0.468923  -0.669819  -1.283910* 
Std. Error  0.181575  0.137458  0.219531  0.726280 
t-Statistic -2.384634  -3.411381  -3.051143  -1.767788 
Prob 0.0192  0.0010  0.0030  0.0804 
DEXTERN -0.137737  -0.063147  -0.107583  0.138957 
Std. Error  0.067633  0.027779  0.048997  0.107868 
t-Statistic -2.036526  -2.273200  -2.195714  1.288210 
Prob 0.0446  0.0254  0.0307  0.2009 
J-statistic 0.075346  0.011056  0.058096  0.058999 
P 0.99462209  0.99969184  0.996339997  0.99625534 
Significant coefficients are presented in bold.  
* significant at the 10% level 
 
4.2  Interpretation of results 
We clearly see that banks liquidity provision has a significantly negative impact on all four 
endogenous demonetization variables. This result confirms our hypothesis on the importance 
of the bank credit liquidity providing function: the difficulties of enterprises to obtain bank 
credit (due to extremely restrictive monetary policy but also to speculative banks’ priorities) 
were responsible for the use of alternative financial sources by enterprises. On the other hand, 
the appearance of positive bank credit dynamics, due to an improving economic situation and 
to a change in banks’ investment strategy, have improved the monetization of the economy. Anna Dorbec 
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The negative impact of EXTERN as an external source of liquidity appears to be lower: it is 
however significantly negative for IMPAY TCREDIT and ENDNET. This result can be 
explained by two factors: the first is the weaker liquidity spreading effect of small number of 
exporters on the overall economy (which is also related to weakness of the redistribution role 
of the highly segmented Russian banking system). Our second hypothesis concerns the 
important capital flight phenomenon (particularly the non-return to Russia of foreign 
currencies gained by exporters). So, the relation could be improved if we correct our 
estimation of the external trade surplus for capital flight. 
  In fact, our econometric estimations confirm the Dorbec and Renversez [2003]
58 
empirical results that the liquidity shortage of 1995-1998 was a main reason for 
demonetization and for the appearance of alternative financing schemes. Nonbank credit, 
wage and budget arrears, inter-enterprise arrears and barterization appear to be second best 
solutions adopted by liquidity constrained enterprises in the period of extremely restrictive 
anti-inflation policy and speculative proclivities of banks. Amelioration of the situation with 
liquidity provision (and particularly the increase in bank credit) was one of the reasons for 
amelioration of the payment situation and remonetization of the economy. 
 
 
5  Liquidity provision versus investment financing:  
the role of uncertainty 
 
In our previous sections we have demonstrated the existence and the importance of bank 
liquidity provision for the Russian economy during the transition period. In fact, Russian 
banks provide liquidity to the real sector and this liquidity provision is an important factor in 
promoting the general monetization of economy. However, the question still persists as to 
why banks provide liquidity but do not provide long and medium term financing. Some 
clarifications is gained by looking at the concept of uncertainty. 
We know that radical market reforms in the Russian transition process made irrelevant the 
existing business practices and consequently the expectations formation process. However, 
                                                 
58 Dorbec A., Renversez F., [2003] “Incidence de la transformation des contextes financiers depuis 1992 sur les 
conditions du financement de l'investissement privé en Russie”, paper presented at the 23th session of Franco-
Russian seminar, Moscow, December, forthcoming in Studies on Russian Economic Development BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





institutions which could facilitate expectations formation and create a new conventional basis 
for expectation were not in place (Stiglitz, [1999]). In fact, the appearance of new institutions 
is not a completely exogenous process (Aoki, [2001]): the institutional system needs time to 
gain agents’ acceptance, to be adjusted to the environment, and to test its enforcement 
mechanism.  
  More generally we can easily demonstrate that the Russian transition is a good 
example of a radical non-probabilistic uncertainty situation. A deep economic crisis 
accompanied by several financial crises added confusion to expectations formation. 
Expectations formation came with increased knowledge about the dynamics of economic 
variables. In this case, information on future developments during the transition-related 
economic reforms cannot be considered as some exogenous probabilistic parameter, but rather 
as the result of ‘learning by doing’.  
  Theoretically speaking, we make a distinction between risk and uncertainty (Knight, 
[1921], Keynes [1936], Tobin [1971]). When we are talking about risk, we mean probabilistic 
risk, the theoretical framework where future states of nature can be evaluated in terms of 
probabilities. In other words, probability laws for all processes and variables are known. 
However, in such a risky environment some informational imperfections could exist:   
probabilistic knowledge could be unequally distributed among agents: in such case we face 
the informational asymmetry problem. In this situation, the institutions (particularly banking 
institutions) are instrument for facilitating informational diffusion and transparency in order to 
diminish the asymmetry problem and reduce transaction costs and, more generally, by issuing 
signals, so as to facilitate economic agents’ expectations formation
59.  
  The uncertainty situation differs fundamentally from probabilistic risk.
60 The 
Keynesian definition of uncertainty is the following: 
“By ‘uncertain’ knowledge […], I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain 
from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject in this sense, to uncertainty; 
nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or again, the expectation of life is only 
slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am 
using the term is that, in which the prospect of a European War is uncertain, or the price of 
copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention or 
the position of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is 
no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not 
know” 
                                                 
59 See North [1990] for the general concept of institutions. For banking specificity, see for example Diamond’s 
[1984] concept of delegated monitoring  
60 Keynes J.M., [1938], « After the General Theory », Collected Writings, 1973, vol. XIV, p. 113-115 Anna Dorbec 
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In this framework banks liquidity provision consists of monetizing claims whose real values 
are fundamentally uncertain. By offering a credit line, a claim on an enterprise, whose value is 
not known with certainty, is transformed into money - uncontestable payment means accepted 
at nominal value (Aglietta [1988]). In this framework banks, as institutions providing liquidity 
on demand, must manage the uncertainty. 
  On the other hand, the financing activity is related to the possibility of forming 
accurate expectations about future yields. The analyses of Nishmura and Osaki, [2002]
61 and 
Aizenman [1995]
62 regarding ambiguity and sub-additive probabilities (imprecise knowledge 
of probabilities in an investment project) shows that the value of waiting to launch an 
investment project increases as the imprecision of the probability estimation increases. 
Moreover, the impossibility of forecasting future earnings renders impossible the financing of 
an investment project. In the situation where banks, as other external finance providers, are 
subject to principal agent problems, such funding from external sources is always more 
difficult than their self financing. So the problems of investment finance by Russian banks 
can be explained by uncertainty or the impossibility of making realistic forecasts about the 
future economic dynamics. Russian enterprise survey results (Kuvalin, Moiseev [2004]) 
reveal that in fact enterprises experience difficulties in forecasting future demand but also 
future financial variables for more than one year ahead and this fact is perceived by firms as 
an important limitation to their investment. 
  In this situation we have observed an important concentration of banks on the liquidity 
providing role – their only natural and one which consequently could be realized in an 
uncertain environment. From the other hand, the ‘financing’ function and, more specifically, 
investment finance naturally require a more predictable environment. The recent stabilization 
and return to growth dynamics confirms the importance of this issue: five years after the 1998 
financial crisis and a return to growth, we observe the first signs of the appearance of medium 
term (more than 3 years) bank credits. 
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6  Concluding remarks 
 
Thus, our findings suggest that in the fundamental uncertainty situation which characterizes a 
period of transition economic reforms in Russia banks are unable to realize a long term 
investment financing. However, our econometric estimations demonstrate that the banks’ role 
is far from being null. In fact, banks provide liquidity to real sector enterprises, and this plays 
a very important role in the smooth functioning of a monetary economy. However, our 
analysis reveals some incompleteness of the overall liquidity providing mechanism due to the 
weakness of the interbank credit market and deposit insurance mechanism. 
  In this situation, special institutional policies dedicated to the anchoring of 
expectations and to restoring trust between economic agents, in order to make the future better 
foreseeable, could induce banks to do more than just provide liquidity. Moreover, such 
policies (legal rules, transparency, corporate governance, etc.) could promote the development 
of financial intermediation as a mechanism for ensuring the transfer of financial surplus from 
extracting-exporting industries to the manufacturing sector; a need that has became urgent 
with the industrial structural changes that occur in Russia actually.  
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Annex I  
 
General Sample Representativeness 
First, we compare enterprise profit to GKS profit for the economy 
 1999  2000 
Profit-loss of total economy  579.0  1046.5 
Profit-loss of sample after outliers elimination 51.0  77.5 





Another necessary evaluation of our panel representativeness can be done by comparing the 
debt structure of enterprises of our sample with that of the economy as a whole (from GKS 
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Concerning the industrial structure, we see that our sample is biased toward ‘hard’ industries. 
However, the abundance of trade organizations in the overall economic landscape is biased by 
the existence of a large number of ‘one-day’ organizations used in fiscal fraud and other 
opaque deals. In fact, the elimination of such enterprises was one of our selection objectives 
and one of the reasons of using balanced panel data.    Anna Dorbec 
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Annex II-a  
Balance sheet determinants of bank indebtedness of firms   
 
Significant coefficients are presented in bold. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. 
The static model is estimated  by FGLS and Within methods with random effects.  
Estimated static model is: 
dette_bq=α1L10+α2L240+α3creditiec+α4affilies+α5*l627+α6*l210+α7l120+α8l410+ui+εit 
The dynamic specification uses the GMM instrumental variables method. The estimation is based on first 
differences of variables and includes a lagged endogenous variable and period dummies. Variables are 
instrumented by their past level data lagged by 2 periods and other balance sheet variables.  
Estimated dynamic model: 
∆dette_bq=lag∆dette_bq++α1∆L10+α2∆L240+α3∆creditiec+α4∆affilies+α5∆l627+α6∆l210+α7∆l120+α8∆l410
+ α9T1+α10T2+α11T3+uit 
Variable   GMM  QGLS  Within 
Y-1 Lag  dette_bq  0.4137784     
 Standard  error  0.0323596     
  t Value   12.78     
 (Pr>/t/)  0     
Turnover L10  0.0128852  0.0711  0.04707 
 Standard  error  0.00934  0.00854  0.00846 
  t Value   1.3790849  8.32   5.56  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.168  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Profit L2140  -0.243371  -0.17556  -0.09666 
 Standard  error  0.0286916  0.02433  0.0236 
  t Value   8.4823103   -7.21    -4.10  
 (Pr>/t/)  0  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Inter-enterprise contractual loans  CREDITIEC  0.0784733  0.04459  0.05089 
 Standard  error  0.0188367  0.2807  0.02693 
  t Value   4.1659792  1.59   1.89  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.000031  0.1123  0.0589 
Commercial credit  L621  -0.031128  -0.04547  -0.01128 
 Standard  error  0.0218863  0.01876  0.02014 
  t Value   1.4222395   -2.42    -0.56  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.1549  0.0154  0.5756 
Affiliated loans  AFFILIES -0.136321  -0.06946  -0.06871 
 Standard  error  0.0218021  0.03552  0.03341 
  t Value   6.252639   -1.96    -2.06  
 (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001  0.0506  0.0398 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





Advances received  L627  0.554879  0.11532  0.14168 
 Standard  error  0.0536681  0.04379  0.0443 
  t Value   10.339082  2.63   3.20  
 (Pr>/t/)  0  0.0085  0.0014 
Stocks L210  0.8849016  0.64465  0.71399 
 Standard  error  0.0846058  0.05214  0.05727 
  t Value   10.459112  12.36   12.47  
 (Pr>/t/)  0  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Machinery and equipment  L120  -0.050901  -0.04291  -0.04944 
 Standard  error  0.0149389  0.00772  0.00986 
  t Value   3.4072733   -5.55    -5.01  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.0006562  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Social capital  L410  -0.019275  0.04466  0.06312 
 Standard  error  0.0323593  0.01592  0.01656 
  t Value   0.8287048  2.81   3.81  
 (Pr>/t/)  0.4072715  0.0051  <0.0001 
Individuals (N)  487  487  487 
Periods (T)    5  5  5 
Observations (NT)  2435  2435  2435 
Explanatory variables (K)  9  9  9 
Instruments (P)  60     
Lag   2     
Sargan (P)    36,50 (0,92)     
R2        0,3042  0,2767 
R2 adj      0,3016  0,274 




DLB     475   
DLW     1937   
Test of absence of individual random effect F (P)  3.6407509 (0)   Anna Dorbec 
 
 
Liquidity provision in transition economy:  




Instruments used are the following:  
 
DETTE_BQ – bank credit all terms confounded 
L10 - turnover 
CREDITIE – long term inter-enterprise contractual loans + affiliated debt (AFFILIES) 
L512- short term inter-enterprise contractual loans 
L621- trade credit 
L627- advances perceived 
L210- stocks 
L622- vexels issued by the enterprise 
L120- machinery and equipment 
L410- social capital 
 
All instruments are in levels with 2 period lag 


























z      3 = T  
                                                 
63 Duguet E.[1999]. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





Annex II-b  
Balance sheet determinants of bank indebtedness of firms  
  
Estimation by sub-periods 
Significant coefficients are presented in bold. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. 
The static model  is estimated by FGLS, Between and Within methods. Dynamic GMM estimation is impossible due to 
extremely small temporal dimension of sub-samples. 
Estimated model is: dette_bq=α1L10+α2L240+α3creditiec+α4affilies+α5*l627+α6*l210+α7l120+α8l410+ui+εit 
    Period 1    1996-1997  Period 2       1999-2000 
Variable    QGLS Within  Between QGLS Within  Between 
Turnover  L10  0.02722 0.09508 0.01791 0.05003 0.01591 0.13559 
  Standard  error  0.00486 0.00712 0.00592 0.01085 0.00735 0.02247 
  t Value   5.59  13.35  3.02  4.61  2.16  6.03 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001 <0.0001  0.0026 <0.0001  0.0309 <0.0001 
Profit  L2140  -0.13639 -0.0539 -0.1872 -0.2519 -0.1131  -0.50378 
  Standard  error  0.01404 0.01747  0.0186 0.03747 0.02715 0.07166 
  t  Value    -9.71 -3.08  -10.06 -6.72 -4.17 -7.03 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001  0.0021 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Inter-enterprise 
contractual loans 
CREDITIEC 0.00976  -0.0779  0.02103  -0.01994  0.03111  -0.10676 
  Standard  error  0.01955 0.02162 0.02526 0.03991 0.02912 0.07355 
  t Value   0.5  -3.6  0.83  -0.5  1.07  -1.45 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.6177 0.0003 0.4057 0.6175 0.2857 0.1473 
Commercial 
credit 
L621  -0.03313 -0.0922  -0.033 -0.0844  -0.064  -0.19739 
  Standard  error  0.00981 0.01065 0.01336 0.02681 0.02291 0.05154 
  t Value   -3.38  -8.66  -2.47  -3.15  -2.8  -3.83 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.0008  <0.0001  0.014 0.0017 0.0053 0.0001 
Affiliated loans  AFFILIES -0.00136  -0.1052  -0.0606  0.01272  -0.02005  0.035 
  Standard  error  0.02551 0.03076 0.03459 0.04645  0.0344 0.10238 
  t Value   -0.05  -3.42  -1.75  0.27  -0.58  0.34 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.9576 0.0006 0.0803 0.7842 0.5601 0.7326 
Advances 
received 
L627  0.14444 0.01768 0.12187 0.12022 0.17389 0.23104 
  Standard  error  0.04799  0.0601  0.058947 0.06754 0.11026 0.09679 
  t  Value    3.01 0.29 2.05 1.78 1.58 2.39 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.0027 0.7687  0.041 0.0754 0.1151 0.0174 
Stocks  L210  0.16941 0.20381 0.18437 0.95052 1.04028 0.79512 Anna Dorbec 
 
 
Liquidity provision in transition economy:  




  Standard  error  0.0229  0.0358 0.02741 0.07239  0.005763 0.13096 
  t Value   7.4  5.69  6.73  13.13  18.05  6.07 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Machinery  /equip.  L120  0.00789  0.0171 0.00727 -0.0206 -0.0709 0.00257 
  Standard  error  0.00273 0.00453 0.00334 0.01548  0.0146 0.02521 
  t Value   2.89  3.77  2.18  -1.33  -4.86  0.1 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.0039 0.0002 0.0301 0.1834  <0.0001 0.9187 
Social  capital  L410  -0.00743 -0.00468 -0.00089 -0.01071  -0.079  0.02931 
  Standard  error  0.0093 0.01316  0.0113 0.02462 0.02065  0.3853 
  t  Value    -0.8 -0.36 -0.08 -0.43 -3.83  0.76 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.4242 0.7222 0.9371 0.6638 0.0001 0.4472 
Individuals  (N)  487 487 487 487 487 487 
Periods  (T)    2 2 2 2 2 2 
Observations  (NT)  974 974 974 974 974 974 
Explanatory  variables  (K)  9 9 9 9 9 9 
R2      0.4371  0.3196  0.558    0.3375  0.4219 
R2  adj    0.4319 0.3133 0.5497   0.3314  0.411 
F value (P)    83.19 (0)  50.37 (0)  66.91 (0)  60.55 (0)  54.63 (0)  38.68 (0) 
DLB/DLW    475/476       475/476   
Test of absence of individual 
random effect F (P) 
1.193  
(0.0275) 
      6.963 (0)     BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 




Annex II-b  
Balance sheet determinants of bank indebtedness of firms  Size sub-samples 
 
Significant coefficients are presented in bold. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. 
The static model is estimated by FGLS, Between and Within methods. We prefer not to use GMM estimation in 
the case of relatively small size of sub-samples. 
Estimated model is: dette_bq=α1L10+α2L240+α3creditiec+α4affilies+α5l627+α6l210+α7l120+α8l410+ui+εit 
   Small and medium 
firms <200 employees 
Big enterprises 
>1000 employees 
Variable    QGLS Within QGLS Within 
Turnover  L10  -0.01794  -0.07755 0.07691 0.06707 
  Standard  error  0.01024  0.0187 0.01763 0.01707 
  t Value   -1.75  -7.13  4.36  3.93 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.0808 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Profit  L2140  -0.0586 -0.05648  -0.1635 -0.09833 
  Standard  error  0.02278 0.01893 0.04399 0.04227 
  t  Value    -2.57 -2.98 -3.72 -2.33 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.0106 0.0031 0.0002 0.0202 
Inter-enterprise contractual loans  CREDITIEC  0.29507  0.11348  -0.06944  -0.04959 
  Standard  error  0.02781 0.03543 0.05352  0.0511 
  t Value   10.61  3.20  -1.3  -0.97 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.001 0.0015 0.1948 0.3321 
Commercial  credit  L621  -0.15012 -0.12297  -0.1085 -0.05084 
  Standard  error  0.04521 0.04783 0.03273 0.03499 
  t  Value    -3.32 -2.57 -3.32 -1.45 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.001 0.0106  0.001 0.1466 
Affiliated loans  AFFILIES  -0.85768  -0.23041 0.06786 0.05025 
  Standard  error  0.17439  0.096629 0.06596 0.06211 
  t Value   -4.92  -2.38  1.03  0.81 
  (Pr>/t/)  0.0000 0.0177 0.3039 0.4187 
Advances  received  L627  4.34588 3.08144 0.15547 0.19804 
  Standard  error  0.50428 0.45311 0.07641 0.07644 
  t  Value    8.62 6.80 2.03 2.59 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001  <0.0001 0.0422 0.0097 
Stocks  L210  0.8595  0.8809 0.93502 0.86412 
  Standard  error  0.22444 0.22565 0.11305 0.11703 
  t  Value    3.83 3.90 8.27 7.38 Anna Dorbec 
 
 
Liquidity provision in transition economy:  




  (Pr>/t/)  0.0002  0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Machinery  and  equipment  L120  -0.21887 0.08063 -0.0307 -0.0183 
  Standard  error  0.04815 0.12708 0.01484 0.02064 
  t Value   -4.55  0.63  -2.07  -0.89 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001 0.5262 0.0391 0.3755 
Social  capital  L410  -0.41715  -0.27225 0.04226 0.06865 
  Standard  error  0.04577  0.0817 0.03266 0.03454 
  t Value   -9.11  -3.33  1.29  1.99 
  (Pr>/t/)  <0.0001 0.001 0.196  0.0472 
Individuals  (N)  64  64 161 161 
Periods  (T)    5 5 5 5 
Observations  (NT)  320 320 805 805 
R2      0.9264  0.91116  0.3502  0.3233 
R2  adj    0.9243 0.9091 0.3428 0.3156 
F value (P)    433.61 (0)  356.49 (0)  47.6 (0)  42.25 (0) 
DLB/DLW   52/245     149/633    
Test of absence of individual random effect F (P)  1.79 
(0.0019) 
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Annex III-a  
Economic importance of banks’ liquidity provision: estimation details 
 
Dependent Variable: DIMPAY       
Method: Generalized Method of Moments     
Sample(adjusted): 1995:08 2003:05     
Included observations: 94 after adjusting endpoints   
No prewhitening         
Bandwidth: Fixed (3)         
Kernel: Bartlett         
Convergence achieved after: 6 weight matrices, 7 total coef iterations 
DIMPAY=C(1)+C(2)*DBC+C(3)*DEXTERN    
Instrument list: DM2 FEDDEF D2A DEXP  DKD D2EXTERN 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
C(1) -0.002925  0.001100  -2.659270  0.0093 
C(2) -0.432989  0.181575  -2.384634  0.0192 
C(3) -0.137737  0.067633  -2.036526  0.0446 
        Mean dependent var  -0.002404 
        S.D. dependent var  0.011270 
S.E. of regression  0.012575      Sum squared resid  0.014390 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.142864      J-statistic  0.075346 
        P    0.994622 
 
For stationarity reasons, all regressions are estimated in first differences.  
Estimated model: ∆IMPAY=CONST+α1∆BANKCREDIT+α2∆EXTERN+εt   
Variable details:  
DIMPAY – first difference of non-payment ratio: overdue debts/total debts 
DBC- first difference of bank credit ratio: bank credit to enterprises/total bank assets 
DEXTERN- first difference of external liquidity ratio trade surplus in roubles/M2 monetary aggregate 
Instrument details 
DM2=M2(t)-M2(t-1), M2 monetary aggregate 
FEDDEF – federal deficit (%) 
D2A is the second difference of total bank assets 
DEXP=export$(t)-export$(t-1), export$ is Russian export in USD 
DKD is a first difference of ‘quasi money’ aggregate (including dollar deposits) 
D2EXTERN=EXTERN(t)-EXTERN(t-2) Anna Dorbec 
 
 
Liquidity provision in transition economy:  




Annex III-b  
Economic importance of banks’ liquidity provision: estimation details 
Dependent Variable: DTCREDIT       
Method: Generalized Method of Moments     
Sample(adjusted): 1995:08 2003:05     
Included observations: 94 after adjusting endpoints   
No prewhitening         
Bandwidth: Fixed (3)       
Kernel: Bartlett         
Convergence achieved after: 3 weight matricies, 4 total coef iterations 
DTCREDIT=C(1)+C(2)*DBC+C(4)*DEXTERN    
Instrument list: DM2 DEXP DSOLDETB DIMP DRATEREAL FEDDEF 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
C(1) -0.000928  0.000651  -1.426244  0.1572 
C(2) -0.468923  0.137458  -3.411381  0.0010 
C(4) -0.063147  0.027779  -2.273200  0.0254 
        Mean dependent var  -0.000860 
        S.D. dependent var  0.004946 
S.E. of regression  0.007287      Sum squared resid  0.004833 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.022323      J-statistic  0.011056 
        P    0.999692 
 
For stationarity reasons, all regressions are estimated in first differences.  
Estimated model: ∆TCREDIT=CONST+α1∆BANKCREDIT+α2∆EXTERN+εt   
Variable details:  
DTCREDIT – first difference of trade credit ratio: trade credit/total debts 
DBC- first difference of bank credit ratio: bank credit to enterprises/total bank assets 
DEXTERN- first difference of external liquidity ratio trade surplus in roubles/M2 monetary aggregate 
Instrument details 
DM2=M2(t)-M2(t-1), M2 monetary aggregate 
DEXP=export$(t)-export$(t-1), export$ is Russian export in USD 
DSOLDETB- first difference of trade surplus in roubles 
DIMP=import$(t)-import$(t-1), import$ is Russian import in USD 
FEDDEF – federal deficit (%) 
DRATEREAL – first difference of real exchange rate index 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





Annex III-b  
Economic importance of banks’ liquidity provision: estimation details 
Dependent Variable: DENDNET       
Method: Generalized Method of Moments     
Sample(adjusted): 1995:08 2003:05     
Included observations: 94 after adjusting endpoints   
No prewhitening         
Bandwidth: Fixed (3)         
Kernel: Bartlett         
Convergence achieved after: 6 weight matricies, 7 total coef iterations 
DENDNET=C(1)+C(2)*DBC+C(4)*DEXTERN    
        
Instrument list: DM2 DEXP DSOLDETB DIMP DRATEREAL FEDDEF 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C(1) 0.000228  0.001187  0.192415  0.8478 
C(2) -0.669819  0.219531  -3.051143  0.0030 
C(4) -0.107583  0.048997  -2.195714  0.0307 
        Mean dependent var  0.000164 
        S.D. dependent var  0.010809 
S.E. of regression  0.026652      Sum squared resid  0.064641 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.247715      J-statistic    0,058096 
        P    0,99634 
 
For stationarity reasons, all regressions are estimated in first differences.  
Estimated model:  ∆ENDNET=CONST+α1∆BANKCREDIT+α2∆EXTERN+εt   
Variable details:  
DENDNET – first difference of endnet ratio : (creditor indebtedness- debtor indebtedness)/total debts 
DBC- first difference of bank credit ratio: bank credit to enterprises/total bank assets 
DEXTERN- first difference of external liquidity ratio trade surplus in roubles/M2 monetary aggregate 
Instrument details 
DM2=M2(t)-M2(t-1), M2 monetary aggregate 
DEXP=export$(t)-export$(t-1), export$ is Russian export in USD 
DSOLDETB- first difference of trade surplus in roubles 
DIMP=import$(t)-import$(t-1), import$ is Russian import in USD 
DRATEREAL – first difference of real exchange rate index 
FEDDEF – federal deficit (%) Anna Dorbec 
 
 
Liquidity provision in transition economy:  




Annex III-d  
Economic importance of banks’ liquidity provision: estimation details 
Dependent Variable: DBARTER       
Method: Generalized Method of Moments     
Sample(adjusted): 1995:08 2003:05     
Included observations: 94 after adjusting endpoints   
No prewhitening         
Bandwidth: Fixed (3)         
Kernel: Bartlett         
Convergence achieved after: 7 weight matricies, 8 total coef iterations 
DBARTER=C(1)+C(2)*DBC+C(4)*DEXTERN    
Instrument list: DM2 DEXP DSOLDETB DIMP DRATEREAL FEDDEF 
        
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C(1) -0.001884  0.002611  -0.721721  0.4723 
C(2) -1.283910  0.726280  -1.767788  0.0804 
C(4) 0.138957  0.107868  1.288210  0.2009 
        Mean dependent var  -0.000691 
        S.D. dependent var  0.026906 
S.E. of regression  0.028528      Sum squared resid  0.074061 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.096387      J-statistic  0,058999 
        P    0,996255 
        
 
For stationarity reasons, all regressions are estimated in first differences.  
Estimated model:  ∆BARTER=CONST+α1∆BANKCREDIT+α2∆EXTERN+εt   
Variable details:  
DBARTER – first difference of BARTER ratio: bartered and other non monetary transactions/total 
transactions 
DBC- first difference of bank credit ratio: bank credit to enterprises/total bank assets 
DEXTERN- first difference of external liquidity ratio trade surplus in roubles/M2 monetary aggregate 
Instrument details 
DM2=M2(t)-M2(t-1), M2 monetary aggregate 
DEXP=export$(t)-export$(t-1), export$ is Russian export in USD 
DSOLDETB- first difference of trade surplus in rubles 
DIMP=import$(t)-import$(t-1), import$ is Russian import in USD 
DRATEREAL – first difference of real exchange rate index 
FEDDEF – federal deficit (%) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





Annex III-e  
Economic importance of banks’ liquidity provision: estimation details.  
Estimation by sub-periods 
 
For stationarity reasons, all regressions are estimated in first differences. Estimation method 
used is GMM.   
  Due to relatively limited size of our sub-samples, we have to be prudent in interpreting 
the presented estimation results. Generally GMM estimations give more robust results with 
relatively long series, so we prefer to draw our conclusions based on the whole series 
estimation. However, sub-sample estimations give us indications of the existence possible 
breaks in banks’ liquidity provision role due to the 1998 financial crisis. We see that the 
impact of bank credit on retained demonetization indicators is negative for both sub-periods. 
Estimated models:  




Period 1:     1995:09 1998:03 
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints 
 DIMPAY  DTCREDIT  DENDNET  DBARTER 
CONST -0.001102  0.000782 0.003625 0.005282* 
Std.  Error  0.001668 0.000573 0.000936 0.002794 
t-Statistic  -0.660717  1.366361 3.873578 1.890612 
Prob  0.5142 0.1827 0.0006 0.0695 
DBC  -0.637806 -0.202322 -0.531731 -0.822447* 
Std.  Error  0.197666 0.069737 0.160000 0.410480 
t-Statistic  -3.226694 -2.901216 -3.323325 -2.003621 
Prob  0.0032 0.0072 0.0025 0.0552 
DEXTERN  -0.007094 -0.020547 -0.283482 -0.720927* 
Std.  Error  0.132063 0.026775 0.112155 0.385857 
t-Statistic  -0.053717 -0.767408 -2.527589 -1.868379 
Prob  0.9575 0.4493 0.0174 0.0726 
J-statistic  0.181263 0.143874 0.110048 0.103487 
P  0.999982041 0.999991882 0.999996781 0.999997397 
  Significant coefficients are presented in bold  * significant at the 10% level  Anna Dorbec 
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Period 2:     1999:01 2003:05 
Included observations: 53 
 DIMPAY  DTCREDIT  DENDNET  DBARTER 
CONST -0.003503  -0.002293  -0.001942*  0.003047 
Std. Error  0.000607  0.000269  0.001066  0.002674 
t-Statistic -5.769842  -8.521198  -1.822146  1.139343 
Prob 0.0000  0.0000  0.0744 0.2609 
DBC -0.182532  -0.071255  -0.350457*  -0.790425* 
Std. Error  0.083161  0.030591  0.178973  0.476299 
t-Statistic -2.194913  -2.329295  -1.958159  -1.659515 
Prob 0.0328  0.0239  0.0558 0.1043 
DEXTERN -0.027547  0.010090  -0.090536  -0.044525 
Std. Error  0.053681  0.021083  0.032562  0.121704 
t-Statistic -0.513166  0.478590  -2.780450  -0.365847 
Prob 0.6101  0.6343  0.0076 0.7163 
J-statistic 0.107671  0.100833  0.053316  0.138482 
P 0.99999702  0.999997621  0.99999974  0.9999475 
Significant coefficients are presented in bold 
* significant at the 10% level  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 





Annex IV-a Stationarity tests 
DIMPAY 
ADF  Test Statistic  -4.135193  1%   Critical Value*  -3.5023 
    5%   Critical Value  -2.8928 
    10% Critical Value  -2.5833 
 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(DIMPAY)     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 02/03/04   Time: 11:35     
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2003:05   
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints 
        
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
DIMPAY(-1) -0.773649  0.187089  -4.13519  0.0001 
D(DIMPAY(-1)) -0.315786  0.149067  -2.11841  0.0370 
D(DIMPAY(-2)) -0.299602  0.100640  -2.97698  0.0038 
C -0.001972  0.001217  -1.62047  0.1087 
      
R-squared  0.589988  Mean dependent var  0.000175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.576010  S.D. dependent var  0.016585 
S.E. of regression  0.010799  Akaike info criterion  -6.17618 
Sum squared resid  0.010263   Schwarz criterion  -6.06654 
Log likelihood  288.1043  F-statistic  42.20923 







 Anna Dorbec 
 
 
Liquidity provision in transition economy:  




Annex IV-b  Stationarity tests 
DTCREDIT 
ADFTest Statistic  -4.213311  1%   Critical Value*  -3.5023 
     5%   Critical Value  -2.8928 
    10% Critical Value  -2.5833 
 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation     
Dependent Variable: D(DTCREDIT)       
Method: Least Squares       
Date: 03/03/04   Time: 16:33       
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2003:05     
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. rror  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
DTCREDIT(-1) -0.747033  0.177303  -4.213311  0.0001 
D(DTCREDIT(-1)) -0.300231  0.147817  -2.031101  0.0453 
D(DTCREDIT(-2)) -0.206085  0.103700  -1.987330  0.0500 
C -0.000711  0.000535  -1.329239  0.1872 
R-squared  0.540396      Mean dependent var  8.83E-06 
AdjustedR-squared  0.524728      S.D. dependent var  0.007135 
S.E. of regression  0.004919      Akaike info criterion  -7.749028 
Sum squared resid  0.002129      Schwarz criterion  -7.639385 
Log likelihood  360.4553      F-statistic  34.48972 
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Annex IV-c  Stationarity tests 
DENDNET 
 
ADF Test Statistic  -4.116366      1%   Critical Value*  -2.5883 
        5%   Critical Value  -1.9436 
        10% Critical Value  -1.6176 
 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation     
Dependent Variable: D(DENDNET)       
Method: Least Squares       
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2003:05     
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints   
        
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
DENDNET(-1) -0.757371 0.183990  -4.116366  0.0001 
D(DENDNET(-1)) -0.345959  0.150724  -2.295307  0.0241 
D(DENDNET(-2)) -0.286956  0.100832  -2.845891  0.0055 
        
R-squared  0.591246  Mean dependent var  -0.000171 
Adjusted R-quared  0.582060  S.D. dependent var  0.016042 
S.E. of regression  0.010371  Akaike info criterion  -6.267602 
Sum squared resid  0.009572  Schwarz criterion  -6.185370 
Log likelihood  291.3097  F-statistic    64.36735 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.052816  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
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Annex IV-d  Stationarity tests 
DBARTER 
ADF Test Statistic  -5.138122      1%   Critical Value*  -3.5023 
        5%   Critical Value  -2.8928 
        10% Critical Value  -2.5833 
        
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
        
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation     
Dependent Variable: D(DBARTER)       
Method: Least Squares       
Date: 03/05/00   Time: 15:58       
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2003:05     
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints   
        
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
DBARTER(-1) -1.034010  0.201243  -5.138122  0.0000 
D(DBARTER(-1)) -0.168844  0.164244  -1.028010  0.3068 
D(DBARTER(-2)) -0.072558  0.106180  -0.683343  0.4962 
C -0.001090  0.002791  -0.390621  0.6970 
        
R-squared  0.613298  Mean dependent var  -0.000228 
Adjusted R-squared  0.600115   S.D. dependent var  0.042287 
S.E. of regression  0.026741  Akaike info criterion  -4.362755 
Sum squared resid  0.062926  Schwarz criterion  -4.253112 
Log likelihood  204.6867  F-statistic    46.52186 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.022891  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
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Annex IV-d  Stationarity tests 
DBC        
ADF Test Statistic  -3.988989   1%   Critical Value*  -3.5023 
      5%   Critical Value  -2.8928 
      10% Critical Value  -2.5833 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis 
of a unit root.         
        
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation         
Dependent Variable: D(DBC)         
Method: Least Squares         
Date: 02/03/04   Time: 11:34         
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2003:05         
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints         
        
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
DBC(-1) -0.586123  0.146935  -3.988989  0.0001 
D(DBC(-1)) -0.248282  0.134975  -1.839459  0.0692 
D(DBC(-2)) -0.118016  0.105992  -1.113443  0.2686 
C -0.000395  0.001208  -0.326782  0.7446 
        
R-squared  0.412318   Mean dependent var  1.09E-05 
Adjusted R-squared  0.392283   S.D. dependent var  0.014829 
S.E. of regression  0.011560   Akaike info criterion  -6.04002 
Sum squared resid  0.011760   Schwarz criterion  -5.93037 
Log likelihood  281.8407   F-statistic  20.58027 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.983795   Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
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Annex IV-d  Stationarity tests 
DEXTERN        
ADF Test Statistic  -6.042300  1%   Critical Value*  -3.5023 
    5%   Critical Value  -2.8928 
    10% Critical Value  -2.5833 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a 
unit root.       
        
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation         
Dependent Variable: D(DEXTERN)         
Method: Least Squares         
Date: 02/03/04   Time: 11:37         
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2003:05         
Included observations: 92 after adjusting 
endpoints        
        
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
DEXTERN(-1) -1.362586  0.225508  -6.042300  0.0000 
D(DEXTERN(-1)) 0.104387  0.170571  0.611986  0.5421 
D(DEXTERN(-2)) -0.076893  0.106483  -0.722110  0.4721 
C 0.000111  0.002392  0.046219  0.9632 
        
R-squared  0.632787  Mean dependent var  -0.000143 
Adjusted R-squared  0.620269  S.D. dependent var  0.037197 
S.E. of regression  0.022921  Akaike info criterion  -4.670985 
Sum squared resid  0.046234  Schwarz criterion  -4.561342 
Log likelihood  218.8653  F-statistic  50.54773 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.982030  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 BOFIT Discussion Papers  http://www.bof.fi/bofit
 
2003  No 1  Karsten Staehr: Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:  
  Complementarity, sequencing and speed 
No 2  Eugene Nivorozhkin: The dynamics of capital structure in transition economies 
No 3  Abdur R. Chowdhury: Do asymmetric terms of trade shocks affect private savings in a transition economy? 
  Published in: Comparative Economic Studies (2003),ISSN 0888-7233. (Forthcoming.)
No 4  Byung-Yeon Kim and Jukka Pirttilä: The political economy of reforms:  
  Empirical evidence from post-communist transition in the 1990s 
No 5  Tuomas Komulainen and Johanna Lukkarila: What drives financial crises in emerging markets? 
  Published in: Emerging Markets Review vol 4, no 3 (2003) pp. 248-272, ISSN 1566-0141. 
No 6      Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen: The Euro goes East: Implications of the 2000-2002 economic  
  slowdown for synchronisation of business cycles between the euro area and CEEs. 
  Published in: Comparative Economic Studies vol. 46 no 1 (2004) pp. 45-62, ISSN 0888-7233.  
No 7  Derek C. Jones, Panu Kalmi and Niels Mygind: Choice of ownership structure and firm performance:  
 Evidence  from  Estonia 
No 8  Michel Funke and Ralf Ruhwedel: Export variety and economic growth in East European transition econmies 
No 9  Laura Solanko: An empirical note on growth and convergence across Russian regions  
No 10  Michael Funke and Holger Strulik: Taxation, growth and welfare:  
  Dynamic effects of Estonia’s 2000 income tax act 
No 11  Jörg Rahn: Bilateral equilibrium exchange rates of EU accession countries against the euro 
No 12  Toni Riipinen: Energy market liberalisation in the FSU–simulations with the GTAP model 
No 13  Natalia Smirnova: Job search behavior of unemployed in Russia 
No 14  Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Jarko Fidrmuc and Ronald MacDonald: The monetary approach to exchange rates in 
 the  CEECs 
No 15  Julius Horvath: Optimum currency area theory: A selective review 
No 16  Pertti Haaparanta, Tuuli Juurikkala, Olga Lazareva, Jukka Pirttilä, Laura Solanko  
  and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya: Firms and public service provision in Russia 
No 17  Michael Funke and Ralf Ruhwedel: Trade, product variety and welfare: A quantitative assessment for the   
  transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
2004  Nro 1  Balázs Égert: Assessing equilirium exchange rates in CEE acceding  countries: Can we have DEER with 
  BEER without FEER? A critical survey of the literature 
Nro 2  Leena Kerkelä: Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation in Russian energy markets: A CGE analysis 
Nro 3  Julius Horvath and Stanislav Vidovic: Price variability and the speed of adjustment to the law of one price: 
 Evidence  from  Slovakia 
Nro 4  Pertti Haaparanta and Mikko Puhakka: Endogenous time preference, investment and development traps 
Nro 5  Iikka Korhonen and Paul Wachtel: Observations on disinflation in transition economies 
Nro 6  Eugene Nivorozhkin: Financing choices of firms in EU accession countries 
Nro 7  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel: Bank performance, efficiency and ownership in transition  
 Countries 
Nro 8  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel: Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries 
Nro 9   Balázs Égert and Kirsten Lommatzsch: Equilibrium exchange rates in the transition:  
  The tradable price-based real appreciation and estimation uncertainty 
Nro 10  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos: Estimating the determinants of foreign direct investment inflows: How 
important are sampling and omitted variable biases? 
Nro 11  Akram Esanov, Christian Merkl, Lúcio Vinhas de Souza: Monetary policy rules for Russia 
Nro 12  Greetje M.M. Everaert: The political economy of restructuring and subsidisation: An international perspective 
Nro 13  Igor Vetlov: The Lithuanian block of the ECSB multi-country model 
Nro 14  Michael Funke and Jörgen Rahn: Just how undervalued is the Chinese renminbi 
Nro 15  Steven Rosefielde: An abnormal country 
Nro 16  Juha-Pekka Koskinen, Tuuli Koivu and Abdur Chowdhury: Selecting inflation indicators under an inflation  
             targeting regime: evidence from the MCL method 




























Bank of Finland 
BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 




Phone: +358 9 183 2268 
Fax: +358 9 183 2294 
Email: bofit@bof.fi 
 
www.bof.fi/bofit 
 
 